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006			m |o d |
007			cr_|||||||||||
008			240307s2024 nju ob 001 0 eng
010			_a 2024008994
020			_a9781119755456 _q(epub)
020			_a9781119755487 _q(adobe pdf)
020			_z9781119755449 _q(paperback)
040			_aDLC _beng _cDLC _erda
050	0	0	_aBD161 _b.C66 2024
082	0	0	_a121 _223
245	0	0	_aContemporary debates in epistemology / _cedited by Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri.
250			_aThird edition.
264		1	_aHoboken, New Jersey : _bWiley-Blackwell, _c[2024]
264		4	_c©2024
300			_axxiii, 360 pages ; _b25 cm.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	0		_aContemporary debates in philosophy
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520			_a"Traditional theories of knowledge explain knowledge in terms of things like justification and belief. Knowledge-first theories of justification and belief explain justification and belief in terms of knowledge. When epistemologists ask whether knowledge "comes first," they are asking whether traditional theories of knowledge take the right approach, or whether knowledge-first theories of things like justification and belief take the right approach. In her contribution to this debate, Mona Simion defends knowledge-first epistemology by defending a knowledge-first theory of belief and using this theory of belief to motivate a knowledge-first theory of justification. In his contribution to this debate, Aidan McGlynn defends traditional epistemology by critiquing Simion's knowledge-first theory of belief. As Simion and McGlynn both recognize, Simion's argument depends on the idea that beliefs that do not amount to knowledge are epistemically defective. While Simion thinks this is plausible, McGlynn thinks we can produce examples of epistemically non-defective beliefs that do not amount to knowledge. As McGlynn acknowledges, his contribution to the debate does not provide a traditional theory of knowledge in place of Simion's knowledge-first theories of justification and belief. However, if McGlynn is right that we can produce examples of epistemically non-defective beliefs that do not amount to knowledge, this casts doubt on at least one central idea in knowledge-first epistemology: that knowledge has explanatory priority over belief"-- _cProvided by publisher.
588			_aDescription based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed.
650		0	_aKnowledge, Theory of.
700	1		_aRoeber, Blake, _eeditor.
700	1		_aSosa, Ernest, _eeditor.
700	1		_aSteup, Matthias, _eeditor.
700	1		_aTurri, John, _eeditor.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _tContemporary debates in epistemology. _bThird edition. _dHoboken, New Jersey : Wiley-Blackwell, c2024 _z9781119755449 _w(DLC) 2024008993
942			_2lcc _cBK
999			_c30765 _d30765